Analysis of the Housing Market in the UK

Analysis of the Housing Market in the UK Introduction For most people in the UK, as in other countries, the purchase of a house is the single largest expenditure they ever make. In contrast with other purchases, a house is not only something that provides highly desirable services – convenient and independent housing – but it is also the single largest element of household wealth. For homeowners, this asset motive for buying a house is becoming increasingly important. As a store of value, houses are increasingly becoming both a critical component in households’ long term financial planning as well as a basis for raising consumption. Just like possessing a portfolio of valuable stocks and bonds, owning a house whose market price amounts to greater wealth. It follows, then, that a change in the market value of a house will change the owner’s wealth, and, consequently, the owner’s consumption expenditure. While the housing market in the U.K. has experienced several dramatic phases in the past three decades[1], its behavior in the last decade or so is not only without precedence but it is also a reflection of a fundamental transformation in the economy’s financial system. Whether being labeled as the product of ‘irrational exuberance’[2] or being described as a ‘bubble’, housing market developments have spawned a wide body of thinking that is increasingly taking on a nervous tone – especially among economists. A quick survey of the macroeconomic literature related to the housing market reveals that the period from the late 1990’s to around 2004 saw a confluence of several phenomena that seem to be related via a series of strong theoretical linkages. Key among these are historically high levels of home-ownership and housing wealth, an extreme housing-price boom, a generously liberal credit regime, unanticipated levels of borrowing, the lowest interest rates in generations, massive consumption expenditures/dangerously low savings rates, general economic prosperity, and, a rising trend in bankruptcies and house possessions. The objective of this project is to highlight the linkage between housing wealth and consumption expenditures with special focus on the events of the last decade. Given the nature of macroeconomic linkages, it turns out that in order to study this relationship in the context of UK, it is necessary to tell an economic tale that incorporates all of the phenomena mentioned above. While there are rather straightforward theoretical reasons as to how and why the national housing wealth affects aggregate consumption, the historical and institutional realities of the financial industry, the changing consumer behavior with respect to credit, the evolving demography etc. have played an important role in shaping this relationship in the UK. Over two-thirds of UK households owned their home and it is typcially their biggest investment they make. At the aggregate level, housing wealth is now greater than the size of their financial holdings[3]) and it is distributed in a considerably more equitable manner across socioeconomic and demographic segments as compared to the latter. Such investments bring reasonable returns over the long term, and in the last five years house price appreciation has more than doubled the value of the stock. It follows, then, that changes in housing wealth have the potential, in theory, to have sizeable effects on consumption, GDP, unemployment etc. The theoretical mechanism by which changes in housing wealth are transmitted into consumer demand, called the ‘wealth effect’ (discussed in detail later in the paper), is of critical importance to the economy because its impulses also affect an array of other macroeconomic variables and processes. Clearly, the ability to draw on this major store of purchasing power has serious implications for the financial health and prosperity of homeowners and, hence, the economy. With respect to access to the ‘frozen’ housing equity, the UK experience has been uniquely successful as compared to those of almost all other OECD countries. A series of policy moves to deregulate and ‘liberalize’ lending practices resulted in democratizing the credit market such that loan products once provided to the privileged, became common-place. Households that had faced credit barriers could now affordably borrow large amounts thus unleashing the power of the wealth effect. Therefore, the ways in which UK households obtain and dispose off the equity is of particular interest to this study.[4] This paper is organized as follows: the next section lays out the key issues involved in this study; the third section discusses the theoretical and analytical matters concerning the wealth effect in the context of the recent UK housing boom; the fourth section surveys the empirical research in this area; the fifth section presents the empirical work done for the study, including a description of the findings from regression analysis using Microfit; and the last section offers some conclusions from the work. (There are graphs and figures associated with the text and they are appended at the end.) A Review of the Peculiar Issues and Macroeconomics of the UK Housing Market Nature of the boom With focus on the 1995-2004 period, this section lays out the key issues involved in understanding of the structure and strength of the relationship between housing wealth and consumption. At the outset it is necessary to have an overview of developments in UK’s housing market during the pertinent period to highlight the generation of housing wealth, the manner in which it is accessed in the form of equity, and channels of disbursement of the equity. The UK housing market became truly energized in the mid-to-late 1990’s, beginning with a property boom in the London area and then gradually spreading to virtually every region. Homeownership levels reached historic levels and so did the share of ‘buy-to-let’ residential investments in the country’s portfolio. Using data published by Halifax-Bank of Scotland, Graph 1 provides the salient market metrics: the price boom accelerated to push the price of the typical house from around  £61,000 in 1995 to over  £161,000 by 2004 – an increase of over 160%; not only was the speed and tenacity of housing prices unprecedented, the annualized percentage growth rate seem to rise with the level of prices. Far from being a localized phenomenon, this housing boom covered the entire UK, as Graph 2 demonstrates. While, the origin of the boom was in Greater London and the Southeast in the mid 1990’s, it quickly enveloped East Anglia and the Southwest. However, by 2001 the boom entered its most vigorous phase as it spread to the peripheral regions with prices almost doubling in a five-year period. Since most of the home purchases are financed through mortgages, the two variables that shape housing demand decisions are the interest rate and property prices. As it turned out, with historically low nominal lending rates (see discussion later), the home prices was the chief determinant behind purchases. The feeding frenzy that was the housing market pumped prices to such a level that placed typical accommodations out of reach of most would-be buyers. The Affordability Index, calculated as the ratio of housing prices to household disposable income, rose from 3.09 in 1995 to 5.45 in 2004. It is useful to note that higher aggregate housing wealth can be a product of a rise in housing prices and/or a growth in the stock of housing. As is displayed in Graph 3, the early 1980’s saw housing wealth grow due to a steady rise in prices while in the late 1980’s and early 1990’s we see stability in it despite declining prices. There was rising home ownership during all three intervals; in the early 1980’s it was engendered by the privatization of some public housing [5, p. 12] while the late 1980’s and early 1990’s it was due to stimulated demand spurred by declining prices and interest rates. With housing prices rising at around 20% per annum, vast slices of society saw the value of their homes reach unseen levels as the market injected equity. This store of equity was virtually a battery filled with purchasing power that was steadily getting charged by the market and that could be tapped into, if needed, to finance purchases. Halifax (2005) reports on it website that at the end of 2005, UK’s housing wealth reached a historic peak at  £3,408 billion which amounts to triple the figure in 1995 with the last five years seeing a 60% increase. As Graph 3 illustrates, since the mid-1990’s the unprecedented spurt in housing wealth can be attributed mainly to rising prices. Clearly, an index of housing prices is an excellent proxy for housing wealth. [5] What generated the price boom? As compared to the preceding 15 years, the last decade saw the housing market subjected to a variety of macroeconomic and financial forces. Following Her Majesty’s Treasury (2003) and Farlow (2004), one can identify demand- and supply-side factors responsible for shaping the current housing market. On the demand side, the key market forces were: According to Her Majesty’s Treasury (2003) the early 1980’s saw a sustained campaign of liberalization of the credit market that led to increased competition among banks and non-traditional lenders, rampant development of new credit products, and enhanced capacity of banks to create liquidity; all of which made obtaining housing loans easier and a more egalitarian process by lowering transaction costs. [6] Low and declining interest rates pushed down the cost of mortgage credit thereby stimulating housing demand; Macroeconomic prosperity with higher disposable income and lowered unemployment rates allowed for more purchasing power; Expectations of continuous expansion and future employment created an optimism among households Despite an ageing population, members of typical home-buying age-cohort (especially baby-boomers) saw their households grow, thus creating a greater demand for family housing; And lastly, the explosion in ‘buy-to-let’ purchases led to a massive speculative demand fueled by expectations of sustained housing price increases. On the supply side, the major market forces according to Farlow (2004) and Her Majesty’s Treasury (2003)were: a low price-elasticity of supply due to a combination of policy regulations, regional scarcity of land, and lags in obtaining licence/local approval; Scarcity of existing housing available for purchase i.e. low vacancy rate; Rising costs of construction, especially due to labour shortage and rising prices of materials. When a strong level of demand and a limited and inelastic housing supply are combined, one can see why prices have risen so quickly. Housing wealth vs. Financial Wealth To understand the rising significance of the recently acquired housing wealth, it is interesting to compare it with the ownership of financial assets in UK. Housing remains UK’s greatest asset with the total of shares, bonds, and cash amounting to  £1.6 trillion. In the past, financial assets pensions and holdings of shares, bonds, and bank accounts accounted for bulk of the nation’s wealth. However, recent history has created housing as the asset that is held more widely and equitably – across geographic regions, age cohorts, and income groups – than financial wealth. Pensions were clearly concentrated among the older age groups and the bulk of other financial assets were held largely by a small opulent minority. Data provided by National Statistics (www.statistics.gov.uk) and Her Majesty’s Treasury (2004) describe UK’s home ownership as widespread across all income and age categories with older segments having a larger rate. Whereas shares and bonds are owned largely by people in higher income groups – for obvious reasons – the housing boom has proved to be a moderating or equalizing force as all homeowners have benefited from rising property values.[7] The English Longitudinal Study of Ageing (2002) provides some supporting evidence in this respect. The study finds that because of the relatively even distribution of recent gains, housing wealth has become more important than non-pension financial wealth, especially in the 50+ age group. The following table shows that not only is the typical size of housing wealth ownership greater than net financial wealth (non-pension), but that it is far less concentrated across society as reflected by the lower inter-quartile ratio and lower Gini coefficient. Table 1. Net Housing Wealth approx. Net Financial Wealth – approx. Mean  £73,000  £44,000 Median  £52,000  £12,000 Inter-quartile ratio 5.14 69.3 Gini Coefficient 0.575 0.761 Source: English Longitudinal Study of Ageing (2002), IFS. The data shown in Graph 4 reveals though financial wealth had dominated all through the 1990’s, the rapid growth of housing wealth since the mid 1990’s coupled with the stock market bust has again placed the two neck and neck. Even with parity in value, the prominence that housing wealth commands in the national balance sheet is the consequence of its relatively equitable distribution and the fact that in spite of recent volatility in housing prices, it is historically far more reliable as an investment than the market value of corporate shares – the dominant component of financial assets. With growth in house prices outstripping the growth in mortgage debt, mortgage equity has increased from  £700 billion in 1995 to  £2.4 trillion at the end of 2005 – a 250% increase. In real terms, the last five years have seen the value of housing stock rise by over 60%. Thanks to housing values rising faster than mortgage debt in each of the last ten years, UK homeowners now have a greater financial buffer for leaner times. Ten years ago, the typical home was worth 2.8 times as much as the typical mortgage; at the end of 2005, this ratio had increased to 3.5, underlining the fact that the country has more equity than a decade ago. Tapping into housing wealth A survey of related literature from Bridges et al (2004), Davey (2001), Farlow (2004), Nickell (2004), and Salt and Macdonald (2004) reveals a variety of ways in households can access the equity stored in the residences. The manner in which a particular household harvests equity depends on the circumstances under which the action is taken. Table 2 below has categorized the possible scenarios. The table explains that households that continue to occupy their home can draw equity by re-mortgaging, i.e. borrow by treating their property as collateral. Households who move could access equity either by over-mortgaging the new home, or by buying a cheaper house in the new location, or by selling their house move to a rental unit (thereby liquidating their asset and obtaining the entire stock of equity). The last possibility covers cases where the owner id deceased or leaves the country, leading to the final sale of the house and the release of 100% of the equity. Table 2. Category of Homeowners Method of Extracting Equity Houseowners retaining possession Re-mortgaging: by taking out additional mortgage(s), borrowers could access equity up to a maximum percentage of value Houseowners that move Down-grading: these households move to a cheaper home, thereby harvesting the equity that equals the difference between the value of sale and the portion of mortgage that was owed Over-mortgaging: these households move to a new residence but manage to obtain a mortgage loan that exceeds the value of the new purchase. This typically occurs in regional markets where there is strong expectations of continuous property-value appreciation Final sale with return to rental: some households sell their houses in order to move to a rental property ostensibly due to either lack of affordability (those with diminished earnings) or convenience (mostly the elderly and the infirm) Households in which the owner(s) are deceased Final sale: when the owners dies, the property is sold with the receipts being used for purposes other than purchase of a house Having harvested the equity, how a given household’s chooses to allocate it across possible uses depends on a range of socio-economic and demographic factors like income level, family size, amount and composition of wealth, age(s) of the members, their geographical location, and even their ethnicity. The following section provides a detailed discussion of the conversion of equity into a specific one use – consumption. Housing wealth and the consumption function: Theory, Analysis, and UK Evidence In this section we begin with outlining the macroeconomic theory behind the consumption function with special reference to the wealth effect. The aim is to both explain the causal relationships behind the various ways in changes in the housing market can impact consumption as well as to identify the factors and circumstances under which the wealth effect might be weakened. The issues in this discussion are with explicit reference to the specific case of the UK. The original Keynesian consumption function was presented as: C = a + bYd(1) Where C denotes real consumption, ‘a’ is the autonomous consumption expenditures, ‘b’ is the parameter symbolizing the marginal propensity to consume (hereafter, mpc) that was postulated as being a constant fraction, and Yd the real disposable income. Shifts in the consumption function are considered as being caused by ‘shocks’ or changes in variables other than Yd. Given the historical period when Keynes first conceived this relationship, it is not surprising that income was the chief driver of consumer spending. Presumably, because wealth was highly concentrated within the aristocracy and credit was a privilege for the few, Keynes decided to lump all non-income influences on consumption into the autonomous term. Over time, with growing sophistication of macroeconomic theory and of market-based economies in general, the consumption function came to be recognized as the following general formulation: C = Æ’(Yd, Real Interest Rate, Price Level, Wealth, Expectations)(2) This explicitly recognized the influence of, among other variables, wealth on consumption decisions, i.e. the wealth effect. However, the formulation stuck with the original assumption of the mpc being constant. That, after all, was acceptable because Keynes’s thinking was anchored in short run considerations and the assumption of unchanging consumers’ sensitivity to income changes was consistent with the model. However, empirical testing of the formulation revealed that not only did the mpc vary with the length of time over which the estimation was conducted (it increased with time), but that its value tended to approach one. This certainly cast a cloud over the consumption function’s relevance and reliability in terms of explaining behaviour.[8] With new thinking about consumption expenditures and about the time-horizon over which a household’s economic decisions were made, two new theories emerged. The Life Cycle Hypothesis (LCH)[9] and the Permanent Income Hypothesis (PIH)[10] both began from the fundamentally un-Keynesian assumption that households make decisions based on their assessment of not only the present but also the anticipated or likely future circumstances. In addition, both also held that rational spending and hence saving decisions necessarily involved long term planning – plausibly for rainy days, growth in family size, and old age. According to Miller (1996) and Gordon (2003), the LCH assumes that permanent incomes are determined over the entire lifetime of the consumer, with allowance for a transitory element that depends on the consumer’s professional status. While the lifetime-oriented income could rise or fall in response to changes in productivity and unexpected events, consumption is smoothed and maintained at an even keel with dissaving (or borrowing) making up any shortfall in spending power. Similarly, in boom periods households save and accumulate purchasing power as wealth for future use. The long term level of income is assumed to follow a smooth path. Clearly, wealth plays a critical part in this model as the household accumulates savings in periods when smoothed consumption is below income. Similarly, as needed, wealth is accessed or made liquid for spending when planned consumption exceeds earnings.[11] The theoretical significance of the LCH – which forms the basis of much of the empirical research reviewed – is easy to see because the way it explicitly incorporates the wealth effect into the household’s lifetime decision horizon with respect consumption, it makes it convenient to model housing wealth. Like the stylized household in the model that begins income-earning phase of her life with modest income and some debt (incurred because of current consumption expenditures exceeding lifetime income), the typical new homeowner is relatively young with a mortgage debt that is several times her annual income and little in terms of savings. Over time, in the absence of tumultuous booms, population and income growth in the economy lead to a steady rise in property values and mortgage equity accumulates. With growing needs for durables, the homeowner then has the possibility of ‘cashing in’ some of the stored housing wealth when current income and savings prove inadequate, much in the same way as the theoretical consumer enters a life-phase during which dissaving takes place. The key idea here is that just like the accumulated housing equity is part of purchasing power for the lifetime, the consumption decision also cannot be inconsistent with a long term budgetary process. This model also suggests that there are periods (or life phases) in the household’s lifetime when wealth is accumulated and when it is used up in the form of consumption. This clearly defines when and under what circumstances mortgage equity is spent. For a young family that continues to occupy a house, the prime motivation is to accumulate equity and harvest it for emergencies or for planned increases in spending that are in balance with expected lifetime earnings which presumably are adjusted for the debt service associated with the additional mortgage. This scenario is consistent with, say, a home improvement project that allows for a larger or growing family or with purchase of durables for a similar purpose. For older homeowners who are approaching retirement or are actually retired, withdrawing equity is consistent with their position in the ‘life-cycle’. Since the income stream is either expected to end or has ended, spending decisions warrant the use of sa vings and/or mortgage equity withdrawals (MEW). Critical to this model is how it treats the rapidly accumulated wealth gains due to a market-driven housing price boom like UK just experienced. Analyzing the housing wealth effect in the context of the LCH, Bridges et al (2004) liken the rise in housing wealth to raising the household’s lifetime budget constraint. Assuming easy access to credit, they identify two pertinent theoretical relationships: one between housing price increases and the lifetime incomes of the wealthier households and the other between housing wealth and the newly acquired debt obligations of the re-mortgaging households. In theory, then, higher housing prices generate wealth effects depending on whether or not the price change is interpreted as permanent or temporary. If households perceive the gains to be permanent or unlikely to be reversed by a sudden housing bust (like what the UK witnessed in the 1980’s and early 1990’s), then it amounts a rise in lifetime income and higher consumpti on expenditures induced by it are ‘allowed.’ On the other hand if the price (and wealth) increases are due to random market activity and will most likely be followed by a decline, then the realized buildup of mortgage equity ought to be regarded as a temporary development and no serious consumption outlays need be planned to spend it. LCH holds that households that are pleasantly surprised by equity gains and choose to borrow against it for extravagance or pleasure spending are fully aware of the future debt-service implications and have made the necessary budgetary calculations that reveal that these actions related to the wealth-effect are compatible with their lifetime income. Curiously, O’Sullivan and Hogan (2003) report that Ireland also experienced a housing boom (though not as extreme as the one in UK), but that there were no signs of a wealth effect. This was presumably because Irish consumers did not put much faith in the housing market’s longevit y and construing the recent price gains as transitory, let the accumulated equity stay ‘frozen.’ However, it is possible that there were indeed impulses related to a housing wealth effect but simultaneously counteracting forces offset it, resulting in generally unchanged aggregate consumption.[12] The above discussion opens up three related and important issues: (i) the process by which accumulated housing wealth translates into consumption expenditure, i.e. the anatomy of the wealth effect in the housing context, (ii) the implications of multiple possible uses of MEW for the strength of the wealth effect, and (iii) other macroeconomic factors that can offset the wealth effect or perhaps prevent it from materializing. Anatomy of the Housing Wealth Effect There are two channels through which homeowners are able to raise their consumption via the wealth effect. As explained above, one way for homeowners to convert their housing wealth is by harvesting mortgage equity MEW. Table 2 outlined the variety of ways in which households obtain equity. Benito and Power (2004), Bridges et al (2004), and Davey (2001) provide insight into how MEW has become a major source of consumer financing in the UK. Graph 5 clearly shows the close relationship between housing prices and MEW[13]. Throughout the last three decades, except for the 2003-2004 interval, UK’s homeowners have reacted to the housing market’s wealth rewards. As Davey (2001) explains, MEW was relatively unimportant in the 1970’s but rose sharply in the following decade. In the early 1980’s despite a recession, MEW climbed because the period coincided with the privatization of public housing. The first half of 1990’s, however, saw a steep decline in hou seholds use of withdrawn equity.In fact there was a brief period when there was a net injection of equity into the housing stock. It could be argued that this was a reflection of a rational economic behaviour on the part of homeowners’ as they assessed a downward trend in housing prices as being detrimental to their long term finances. With a declining value of their housing wealth, UK’s homeowners cut back on withdrawals. Since the mid-1990’s price boom, that downward trend in MEW was quickly reversed. This period saw MEW grow faster than housing prices hinting at the possibility of a overly optimistic body of borrowers who expected housing prices and equity accumulation to continue rising at an ever increasing rate. Since at least part of the MEW is withdrawn by homeowners re-mortgaging their houses (see Table 2), this translates into loans secured by their properties. Halifax – BOS (2005) offer compelling evidence in this respect. They report that in 2 004, total gross lending secured by dwellings was an astronomical  £291 billion – 4% more than the previous year. The figure that was a mere  £57 billion in 1995, doubled by 1999 and with growth rates sometimes exceeding 35% had risen to five times that level in 2004. This monumental withdrawal can be interpreted as a major windfall for the homeowners who suddenly found themselves swimming in an ocean of purchasing power made available by the housing market. The other channel through which housing wealth engenders greater purchasing power in the hands of homeowners is comparatively subtle mechanism. Bridges et al (2004) discuss in great detail, how even without using their property s collateral, homeowners have gained access to ever rising amounts of unsecured credit. The rising value of housing wealth was interpreted by banks and other lenders as indicative of greater borrowing ability, i.e. greater creditworthiness. Naturally, this perception of the lenders was shaped, in part, by expectations of continuous a housing boom. A side implication of this phenomenon is that homeownership in the UK had become a screening device or filter for lenders’ decisions about whom to consider for loans. It follows that this would place renters at a disadvantage with respect to access to credit. Several studies, including Bridges at al (2004) have cited evidence of homeowners being supplied credit on terms far more favorable than those offered to non-owners. It can be reasonably expected that a large portion of the unsecured borrowing was directed toward consumption. Critical to both these channels is the issue of the ease with homeowners are able to obtain credit in lieu of their housing wealth. The mere existence of mortgage equity must be complemented with an efficient system to gain access to it for the wealth effect to take place. Benito (2004), Bridges et al (2004), and Her Majesty’s Treasury (2003) all stress that the liberalization of UK’s financial system that began in 1979 (see footnote 6 in Sec. 2) has been instrumental in creating a credit market that has facilitated the historic levels of MEW. With rising competition among banks and building societies and tremendous product innovation, the lending industry has created a series of affordable and accessible ways in which homeowners can obtain credit. All three studies portray the boom in housing prices and MEW in the UK as unique as compared to all other OECD economies. The coincidence of rising housing prices created huge reserves of withdrawable mortgage equity and supply-side changes in the form of lower restrictions on lending practices and other financial reform is responsible for the explosion in MEW sin

Pnl Explain

P&L Explain – Bonds and Swaps Tony Morris antony. [email  protected] com MICS – DKS Manila Contents 1. Bond Pricing – basic concepts 2. P&L sensitivities of a bond i. PV01 ii. CS01 iii. Theta iv. Carry 3. Extension to interest rate swaps 1. Bond Pricing – basic concepts Let’s say you have a 4 year 10% annual coupon bond, with a yield (‘yield to maturity’ or ‘yield to redemption’) of 12%. From this information, the price can be calculated as 93. 93%. The price is calculated by pricing each of the bond’s cash flows using the yield to maturity (YTM) as a discount rate.Why? Because the YTM is defined as the rate which, if used to discount the bond’s cash flows, gives its price. We could picture it like this: Bond Cash Flows on a Time Scale Each fixed coupon of 10% is discounted back to today by the yield to maturity of 12%: 93. 93% = 10 + 10 + 10 + 110 (1. 12)1 (1. 12)2 (1. 12)3 (1. 12)4 All we are doing is obse rving the yield in the market and solving for the price. Alternatively, we could work out the yield if we have the price from the market.Bond price calculators work by iteratively solving for the yield to maturity. For a bond trading at par, the yield to maturity and coupon will be the same, e. g. a four year bond with a fixed coupon of 10% and a yield of 10% would be trading at 100%. Note that bond prices go down as yields go up and bond prices go up as yields go down. This inverse relationship between bond prices and yields is fairly intuitive. For our par bond above, if four year market yields fall to 9% investors will be willing to pay more than par to buy the above market coupons of 10%. This will force its price up until it, too, yields 9%.If yields rise to, say, 11% investors will only be willing to pay less than par for the bond because its coupon is below the market. For a detailed example of the bond pricing process, see Appendix 3. For now, note that the dirty price of a bond is the sum of the present values of the cash flows in the bond. The price quoted in the market, the so-called â€Å"clean† price or market price, is in fact not the present value of anything. It is only an accountants’ convention. The market price, or clean price, is the present value less accrued interest according to the market convention. . P&L sensitivities of a bond As we saw above, the price of a bond can be determined if we know its cash flows and the discount rate (i. e. YTM) at which to present value them. The yield curve from which are derived the discount factors for a bond can itself be considered as the sum of two curves: 1. the â€Å"underlying† yield curve (normally Libor), and 2. the â€Å"credit† curve i. e. the spread over the underlying curve The sensitivity of the bond price to a change in these two curves is called: i. PV01, and ii. CS01 respectively. Related essay: â€Å"Support Positive Risk Taking For Individuals†In terms of the example above, the discount rate of 12% might be broken down into, say, a Libor rate of 7% together with a credit spread of 5%. (Note, in the following, it is important not to confuse the discount rate, which is an annualised yield, and the discount factor, which is the result of compounding the discount rate over the maturity in question. ) In addition to the sensitivities described above, we can also consider the impact on the price of the bond of a one day reduction in maturity. Such a reduction affects the price for two reasons: ) assuming the yield curve isn’t flat, the discount rates will alter because, in general, the discount rate for time â€Å"t† is not the same as that for time â€Å"t-1† b) since one day has elapsed, whatever the discount rate, we will compound it based on a time interval that is shorter by one day The names given to these two sensitivities are, r espectively: iii. Theta, and iv. Carry Note that, of these four sensitivities, only the first two, i. e. PV01 and CS01, are â€Å"market sensitivities† in the sense that they correspond to sensitivities to changes in market parameters.Theta and Carry are independent of any change in the market and reflect different aspects of the sensitivity to the passage of time. i)PV01 Definition The PV01 of a bond is defined as the present value impact of a 1 basis point (0. 01%) increase (or â€Å"bump†) in the yield curve. In the derivation below, we will refer to a generic â€Å"discount curve†. As noted earlier, this discount curve, from which are derived the discount factors for the bond pricing calculation, can itself be considered as the sum of two curves: the â€Å"underlying† yield curve (normally Libor), and a credit curve (reflecting the risk over and above the interbank risk ncorporated in the Libor curve). The PV01 calculates the impact on the price of bu mping the underlying yield curve. Calculation For simplicity, consider the case of a zero coupon bond i. e. where there is only one cash flow, equal to the face value, and occurring at maturity in n years. Note, though, that the principles of the following analysis will equally apply to a coupon paying bond. We start by defining: P = price or present value today R(t) = discount rate, today, for maturity t FV = face value of the bond Then, from the above, we know:P = FV/(1+r(t))^n Now consider the impact a 1bp bump to this curve. The discount rate becomes: R(t) = R(t) + 0. 0001 The new price of the bond, Pb(t), will be: Pb = FV/(1+[r(t)+. 0001])^n Therefore, the sensitivity of this bond to a 1bp increase to the discount curve will be: Pb – P = FV/(1+[r(t)+. 0001])^n – FV/(1+r(t))^n Eqn. 1 The first term is always smaller than the second term, therefore: * if we hold the bond (long posn), the PV01 is negative * if we have short sold the bond (short posn), the PV01 is pos itive We can also see that: the higher the yield (discount rate), the smaller the PV01. This is because a move in the discount rate from, for example, 8. 00% to 8. 01% represents a smaller relative change than from 3. 00% to 3. 01%. In other words, the higher the yield, the less sensitive is the bond price to an absolute change in the yield * the longer the maturity, the bigger the PV01. This is more obvious – the longer the maturity, the bigger the compounding factor that is applied to the changed discount rate, therefore the bigger the impact it will have.To extend this method to a coupon paying bond, we simply note that any bond can be considered as a series of individual cash flows. The PV01 of each cash flow is calculated as above, by bumping the underlying yield curve at the corresponding maturity. In practice, where a portfolio contains many bonds, it would not be practical, nor provide useful information, to have a PV01 for every single cash flow. Therefore the cash f lows across all the positions are bucketed into different maturities. The PV01 is calculated on a bucketed basis i. e. by calculating the impact of a 1bp bump to the yield curve on each bucket individually.This is an approximation but enables the trader to manage his risk position by having a feel for his overall exposure at each of a series of maturities. Typical bucketing might be: o/n, 1wk, 1m, 2m, 3m, 6m, 9m, 1y, 2y, 3y, 5y, 10y, 15y, 20y, 30y. Worked example: Assume we hold $10m notional of a zero-coupon bond maturing in 7 years and the yield to maturity is 8%. Note that, for a zero coupon bond, the YTM is, by definition, the same as the discount rate to be applied to the (bullet) payment at maturity. We have: Price, P = $10m / (1. 08)^7 = $5. 834mBumping the curve by 1bp, the â€Å"bumped price† becomes: Pb = $10m / (1. 0801)^7 = $5. 831m Therefore, the PV01 is: Pb – P = $5. 831m – $5. 835m = -$0. 004m (or -$4k) Meaning In the example above, we have calcul ated the PV01 of the bond to be -$4k. This means that, if the underlying yield curve were to increase from its current level of 8% to 8. 01%, the position would reduce in value by $4k. If we assume the rate of change in value of the bond with respect to the yield is constant, then we can calculate the impact of, for example, a 5bp bump to the yield curve to be 5 x -$4k = -$20k.Note, this is only an approximation; if we were to graph the bond price against its yield, we wouldn’t see a straight line but a curve. This non-linear effect is called convexity. In practice, while for small changes in the yield the approximation is valid, for bigger changes, convexity cannot be ignored. For example, if the yield were to increase to 9%, the impact on the price would be -$365k, not -(8%-9%)x$4k = -$400k. Use The concept of PV01 is of vital day to day importance to the trader. In practice, he manages his trading portfolio by monitoring the bucketed yield curve exposure as expressed by PV 01.Where he feels the PV01 is too large, he will perform a transaction designed to either flatten or reduce the risk. Similarly, when he has a view as to future yield curve movements, he will position his PV01 exposure to take advantage of them. In this case, he is taking a trading position. ii)CS01 The basis of the CS01 calculation is identical to that of the PV01, only this time we bump the credit spread rather than the underlying yield curve. The above example was based on a generic discount rate. In practice, for any bond other than a risk free one, this rate will be combination of the yield curve together with the credit curve.At first glance therefore, we would expect that, whether we bump the yield curve or the credit spread by 1bp, the impact on the price should be similar, and described by Eqn. 1 above. What we can also say is that, bumping the yield curve, the overall discount rate will increase and therefore, as for PV01: * if we hold the bond (long posn), the CS01 is neg ative * if we have short sold the bond (short posn), the CS01 is positive From the same considerations as for PV01, we can see that: * the higher the credit spread, the smaller the CS01 * the longer the maturity, the bigger the CS01In practice, when we look at multiple cash flows, the impact of a 1bp bump in the yield curve is not identical to a 1bp bump in the credit spread. This is because, inter alia: * the curves are not the same shape and therefore interpolations will differ * bumping the credit spread affects default probability assumptions that will, in turn, impact the bond price In general though, PV01 and CS01 for a fixed coupon bond will be similar. The exception is where the bond pays a floating rate coupon. In this case, the sensitivity to yield curve changes is close to zero so, although the PV01 will be very small, the CS01 will be â€Å"normal†.Worked example: A worked example would follow the same steps as for PV01 above, only this time we would bump the cred it spread by 1bp rather than the underlying yield curve. Theta and Carry We now look at the two sensitivities arising from the passage of time (â€Å"1 day decay†, to use option pricing terminology). First, let’s calculate what the total impact on the value of a position would be if the only change were that one day had passed. In particular, we assume that the yield and credit curves are unchanged. Again, for simplicity, consider the case of a zero coupon bond i. . where there is only one cash flow, equal to the face value, and occurring at maturity in n years. Again, we note that the principles of the following analysis will equally apply to a coupon paying bond. Following the previous notation, the value (or price) today will be: P(today) = FV/(1+r(t))^n The value tomorrow will be: P(tomorrow) = FV/(1+r(t-1))^(n-1/365)Eqn. 2 There are two differences between the formula for the value today and that for tomorrow. Firstly, the discount rate has moved from r(t) to r(t- 1). Here, r(t-1) is the discount rate for maturity (t-1) today.We have assumed that the discount curve does not move day on day, therefore the rate at which the cash flow will be discounted tomorrow is the rate corresponding to a one day shorter maturity, today. Secondly, the period over which we discount the cash flows has reduced by one day, from n to n-1/365 (we divide by 365 because n is specified in years). Theta and Carry capture these two factors. P(tomorrow) – P(today) gives the full impact on the price due to the passing of one day. This impact can be approximated by breaking down the above formula into its two component parts i. e. he change in discount rate and the change in maturity, as explained below. iii)Theta As before, we define: P = price or present value today r(t) = discount rate, today, for maturity t FV = face value of the bond In addition, we define: r(t-1) = discount rate, today, for maturity t-1 (e. g. for a bond with 240 days to maturity, if the 240 day discount rate today is 8. 00% and the 239 day discount rate today is 7. 96% then: r(t) = 8. 00% and r(t-1) = 7. 96%) We now define Theta as: FV/(1+r(t-1))^n – FV/(1+r(t))^n We can see that, compared to the formula for the full price impact above (Eqn. ), this sensitivity reflects the change in the discount rate but ignores the reduction by 1 day of the maturity. In other words, Theta represents the price impact due purely to the change in discount rate resulting from a 1 day shorter maturity but ignores the impact on the compounding factor of the discount rate resulting from the shorter maturity. Note that the sign of Theta, in contrast to PV01 and CS01, can be both positive and negative. This is because r(t-1) can be higher or lower than r(t), depending on the shape of the yield curve.That said, in practice, given that yield curves are normally upward sloping, we would expect r(t) to be higher than r(t-1). Therefore Theta will normally be positive. In the same way, if th e yield curve is flat, then Theta will be zero. iv)Carry Using the standard notation, we define Carry as: FV/(1+r(t))^(n-1) – FV/(1+r(t))^n Comparing to the formula for the full price impact above (Eqn. 2), we see that this sensitivity reflects the change in maturity on the compounding factor to be applied to the discount rate but ignores the impact on the discount rate itself of moving one day down the curve.In other words, Carry represents the price impact due purely to the change in discount factor resulting from a 1 day shorter compounding period but ignores the impact on the discount rate resulting from the shorter maturity. Where discount rates are positive (r(t) > 0), Carry will always be positive since the first term will be larger than the second. Using the Taylor expansion, we can obtain a simplified approximate value for Carry. Remembering that: 1/(1+x)^n = 1 – n. x + (1/2). n. (n-1). x^2 – †¦ we have: Carry = FV. 1-(n-1/365). r(t)) – FV. (1-n. r(t)) = FV. r(t). 1/365 Note that r(t). 1/365 would represent one day’s â€Å"interest† calculated on an accruals basis since, in the case, the yield equals the coupon rate. (Note, where a position is accounted for on an accruals basis, and therefore valued at par, the yield will always equal the coupon. ) In other words, this definition ties in to the intuitive idea of carry that we have from, say, a deposit where the carry would be equal to one day’s interest, based on its coupon.We can also see that Carry is directly proportional to the yield. We have now seen that, between them, Theta and Carry attempt to capture the two components affecting the price move arising from the passing of 1 day, all other factors being kept constant. There will be certain â€Å"cross† effects of the two that will not be captured when performing this decomposition. In other words, Theta + Carry will not exactly equal the full impact (as per Eqn. 2). The difference, ho wever, will not normally be material.In general, for a long bond position, both Theta and Carry will be positive as, with the passing of one day, not only will the annualised discount rate be less (reflecting the lower yield normally required for shorter dated instruments) but the compounding factor will be smaller (reflecting the shorter maturity). Worked example: Assume we hold $10m notional of a zero-coupon bond maturing in 240 days and the yield to maturity today is 8%. Also, the yield today for the 239 day maturity is 7. 96%. Theta = $10m/(1. 0796)^(240/365) – $10m/(1. 08)^(240/365) = $23,159 Carry = $10m/(1. 8)^(239/365) – $10m/(1. 08)^(240/365) $20,047 Theta + Carry = $43,205 To compare, the full price impact of a 1 day â€Å"decay† is: $10m/(1. 076)^(239/365) – $10m/(1. 08)^(240/365) = $43,113 Summary We have now analysed the key sensitivities that explain the 1 day move in a bond’s mark to market value. To summarise some of the main featur es; for a long bond position: PV01 / CS01: * negative * for a fixed coupon or zero coupon bond, PV01 and CS01 will be similar * the higher the yield/credit spread, the smaller the PV01/CS01 * the longer the maturity, the bigger the PV01/CS01 for a floating rate coupon (with a Libor benchmark), PV01 will be very small but the CS01 will be â€Å"normal† Theta * positive * the flatter the curve, the smaller the Theta Carry * positive * proportional to the yield 3. Extension to interest rate swaps In essence, all the above applies equally to interest rate swaps (IRSs) when calculating/explaining daily P&L. We start by noting that an IRS is simply the exchange of two cash flows, one fixed and one floating. Extending the analysis we made for bonds, we can say: a) The PV01 of the floating rate leg will be close to zero. This is as noted for a floating rate bond.In both cases, as the yield curve changes so do the expected future cash flows but, at the same time, so will the discount rates at which they are PV’d. The two effects will broadly cancel out. (The PV01 will not be exactly zero because, once the Libor fixing occurs, the next cash flow becomes fixed and therefore effectively becomes a zero coupon bond, on which there will be PV01. ) b) The fixed leg is similar to the fixed coupon stream on a bond and can be considered as a series of zero coupon bonds. Therefore the exact same analysis as applied to bonds above will apply to the fixed leg. An IRS that ays floating and receives fixed will have a PV01 sensitivity similar to that of a long bond position. c) IRSs are normally interbank trades where it is assumed that there is no credit risk over and above Libor. Therefore, the CS01 will be zero. d) Theta and Carry may be either positive or negative. Appendix 1 : Date Conventions There are several methods for computing the interest payable in a period and the accrued interest for a period. A particular method applied to a transaction can affect the yie ld of that transaction and also the payment for a transaction. Counting the Number of DaysThe conventions used to determine the interest payments depend on two factors: 1) The number of days in a period and 2) The number of days in a year. The conventions are: 0 Actual/360 1 Actual/365 : sometimes referred as Actual/365F (seldom used now) 2 Actual/Actual 3 30/360 European: sometimes referred to as ISMA method (30E/360) 4 30/360 US (30U/360) The first three methods (Actual/360, Actual/365 and Actual/Actual) calculate the number of days in a period by counting the actual number of days. For each method the number of days in a year is different. Actual/365 and Actual/Actual are similar except: 1.Periods which include February 29th (leap year) count the number of days in a year as 365 under Act/365 and 366 under Act/Act; 2. Semi-annual periods are assumed to have 182. 5 days under Act/365 and however many actual days under Act/Act. Eurobond markets use the 30E/360 basis. This calculatio n assumes every month has 30 days. This means that the 31st of a month is always counted as if it were the 30th of the month. For 30E/360 basis, February is also assumed to have 30 days. If the beginning or end of a period falls on a weekend the coupon is not adjusted to a good business day.This means that there are always exactly 360 days in a year for all coupons. For example a coupon from 08-November-1997 to 08-November-1998 of 5% is a coupon of 5%, even though 08-November-1998 is a Sunday. There is no adjustment to the actual coupon payment. The various European government bond markets are described below: Country| Accrual| Coupon Frequency| Austria| Act/Act| Annual| Belgium| Act/Act| Annual| Denmark| Act/Act| Annual| Finland| Act/Act| Annual| France| Act/Act| Annual| Germany| Act/Act| Annual| Ireland| Act/ActAct/Act (Earlier Issues)| AnnualSemi-Annual| Italy| Act/Act| Semi-Annual| Luxembourg| Act/Act| Annual|Netherlands| Act/Act| Annual| Norway| Act/Act| Annual or Semi-Annual| Portugal| Act/Act| Annual| Spain| Act/Act| Annual| Sweden| Act/Act| Annual| Switzerland| Act/Act| Annual| United Kingdom| Act/Act | Semi-Annual| Appendix 2 : Calculating Accrued Interest Even though Eurobond coupons are not adjusted for weekends and holidays, the accrual of a coupon for any part of the year has to use the correct number of days. The difference between European and US 30/360 method is how the end of the month is treated. For US basis the 31st of a month is treated as the 1st of the next month, unless the period is from 30th or 31st of the previous month.In this case the period is counted as number of months: | 30/360 European| 30/360 US| Beginning DateEnding Date| M1/D1/ Y1M2/D2/Y 2| M1/D1/Y1M2/D2/Y 2| If D1 = 31| D1 = 30| D1 = 30| If D2 = 31| D2 = 30| If D1 = 31 or 30Then: D2 = 30Else: D2 = 31| The difference occurs when the accrual period starts and ends at the end or beginning of a calendar month: European and US 30/360 Examples Start| End| European| US| Actual| 3 1-Jul-01| 31-Oct-01| 90| 90| 92| 30-Jul-01| 30-Oct-01| 90| 90| 92| 30-Jul-01| 01-Nov-01| 91| 91| 94| 29-Jul-01| 31-Oct-01| 91| 92| 94| 01-Aug-01| 31-Oct-01| 89| 90| 91|Euro money markets: 0 Day count basis: actual/360 1 Settlement basis: spot (two day) standard 2 Fixing period for derivatives contracts: two day rate fixing convention Euro FX markets 3 Settlement timing: spot convention, with interest accrual beginning on the second day after the deal has been struck 4 Quotation: ‘Certain for uncertain’ (ie 1 Euro = x foreign currency units) U. S. Conventions Product| Day Count Convention| USD LIBOR| Act/360| USD Swap Fixed Rate in U. S. | Act/Act s. a. | USD Swap Fixed Rate in London| Act/360 p. a. | T-Bills| Act/360 discount rate| Government Bonds| Act/Act s. a. |Agency and Corporate Bonds| 30/360 s. a. | Appendix 3 : Detailed worked example of bond price calculation We can check the pricing of bonds in a more complicated example by using the following German governmen t bond (or Bund) : German Government Bund (in Euros) Coupon:| 5. 00%| Maturity:| 04-Feb-06| Price (Clean):| 102. 2651%| Yield:| 4. 43%| We are pricing this bond on 27/July 2001. It matures on 4 Feb 2006 and has a coupon of 5%. The table below shows that the bond price (the ‘dirty price’ or invoice price) is simply the sum of the present value of all of the coupons discounted at the yield to maturity.Pricing the German Euro Denominated Bund Dates| AA Days| Periods| Cash Flow| Cashflow PV| 04-Feb-01| | | | | 27-Jul-01| | | | 104. 6350%| 04-Feb-02| 192| 0. 5260| 5. 00%| 4. 8873%| 04-Feb-03| 557| 1. 5260| 5. 00%| 4. 6800%| 04-Feb-04| 922| 2. 5260| 5. 00%| 4. 4814%| 04-Feb-05| 1288| 3. 5260| 5. 00%| 4. 2913%| 04-Feb-06| 1653| 4. 5260| 105. 00%| 86. 2950%| The market convention uses the yield to maturity as the discount rate, and discounts each cash flow back over the number of periods as calculated using the accrued interest day-count convention.In the case of Bunds, the day -count convention is the Act/Act convention. Appendix 1 contains more details of date conventions – it is recommended that you read this at the end of the module. The part of a year between the settlement date (27 July 2001) and the next coupon (4 February 2002) is: Day Count 192/365 (ie Actual days/Actual days) = 0. 5260 The price of the first coupon can therefore be calculated in the following way: PV of First Coupon = 4. 8873% All of the other cash flow present values are calculated in the same manner. Adding them up gives us the price of the bond.Accrued interest is calculated from 04 February 2001 to 27 July 2001 (173 days) : Accrued Interest Accrued = 5% x 0. 47397 = 2. 3699% There is more detail on Accrued interest in Appendix 2. It is recommended that you read it at the end of this module. Notice that the quoted price of the bond (the ‘clean price’) is 102. 2651% not 104. 6350% (which is the ‘dirty price’ or invoice price – ie the pric e actually paid for the bond). The dirty price is the sum of the present values of the cash flows in the bond. The price quoted in the market, the so-called â€Å"clean† price or market price, is in fact not the present value of anything.It is only an accountants’ convention. The market price, or clean price, is the present value less accrued interest according to the market convention. Practitioners find it easier to quote the clean price because it abstracts from the changing daily accrued interest (i. e. it avoids a â€Å"saw-toothed† price profile). This publication is for internal use only by Deutsche Bank Global Markets employees. The material (including formulae and spreadsheets) is provided for education purposes only and should under no circumstances be used for client pricing.Examples, case studies, exercises and solutions may use simplifying assumptions that do not apply in practice, and may differ from Deutsche Bank proprietary models actually used. The publication is provided to you solely for information purposes and is not intended as an offer or solicitation for the purchase or sale of any financial instrument or product. The information contained herein has been obtained from sources believed to be reliable, but is not necessarily complete and its accuracy cannot be guaranteed.

Jane Jacobs New Urbanist Who Transformed City Planning

American and Canadian writer and activist Jane Jacobs transformed the field of urban planning with her writing about American cities and her grass-roots organizing.  She led resistance to the wholesale replacement of urban communities with high rise buildings and the loss of community to expressways. Along with Lewis Mumford, she is considered a founder of the New Urbanist movement. Jacobs saw cities as living ecosystems.  She took a systemic look at all the elements of a city, looking at them not just individually, but as parts of an interconnected system. She supported bottom-up community planning, relying on the wisdom of those who lived in the neighborhoods to know what would best suit the location. She preferred mixed-use neighborhoods to separate residential and commercial functions and fought conventional wisdom against high-density building, believing that well-planned high density did not necessarily mean overcrowding. She also believed in preserving or transforming old buildings where possible, rather than tearing them down and replacing them. Early Life Jane Jacobs was born Jane Butzner on May 4, 1916. Her mother, Bess Robison Butzner, was a teacher and nurse. Her father, John Decker Butzner, was a physician. They were a Jewish family in the predominantly Roman Catholic city of Scranton, Pennsylvania. Jane attended Scranton High School and, after graduation, worked for a local newspaper. New York In 1935, Jane and her sister Betty moved to Brooklyn, New York. But Jane was endlessly attracted to the streets of Greenwich Village and moved to the neighborhood, with her sister, shortly after.   When she moved to New York City, Jane began working as a secretary and writer, with a particular interest in writing about the city itself. She studied at Columbia for two years and then left for a job with Iron Age magazine. Her other places of employment included the Office of War Information and the U.S. State Department. In 1944, she married Robert Hyde Jacobs, Jr, an architect working on airplane design during the war. After the war, he returned to his career in architecture, and she to writing. They bought a house in Greenwich Village and started a backyard garden. Still working for the U.S. State Department, Jane Jacobs became a target of suspicion in the McCarthyism purge of communists in the department. Though she had been actively anti-communist, her support of unions brought her under suspicion. Her written response to the Loyalty Security Board defended free speech and the protection of extremist ideas. Challenging the Consensus on Urban Planning In 1952, Jane Jacobs began working at Architectural Forum, after the publication she’d been writing for before moving to Washington. She continued to write articles about urban planning projects and later served as the associate editor. After investigating and reporting on several urban development projects in Philadelphia and East Harlem, she came to believe that much of the common consensus on urban planning exhibited little compassion for the people involved, especially African Americans. She observed that â€Å"revitalization† often came at the expense of the community.   In 1956, Jacobs was asked to substitute for another Architectural Forum writer and give a lecture at Harvard. She talked about her observations on East Harlem, and the importance of â€Å"strips of chaos† over â€Å"our concept of urban order.†Ã‚   The speech was well-received, and she was asked to write for Fortune magazine. She used that occasion to write â€Å"Downtown Is for People† criticizing Parks Commissioner Robert Moses for his approach to redevelopment in New York City, which she believed neglected the needs of the community by focusing too heavily on concepts like scale, order, and efficiency. In 1958, Jacobs received a large grant from The Rockefeller Foundation to study city planning.  She linked up with the New School in New York, and after three years, published the book for which she is most renowned, The Death and Life of Great American Cities. She was denounced for this by many who were in the city planning field, often with gender-specific insults, minimizing her credibility. She was criticized for not including an analysis of race, and for not opposing all gentrification. Greenwich Village Jacobs became an activist working against the plans from Robert Moses to tear down existing buildings in Greenwich Village and build high rises. She generally opposed top-down decision-making, as practiced by master builders like Moses. She warned against overexpansion of New York University. She opposed the proposed expressway that would have connected two bridges to Brooklyn with the Holland Tunnel, displacing much housing and many businesses in Washington Square Park and the West Village. This would have destroyed Washington Square Park, and preserving the park became a focus of activism. She was arrested during one demonstration. These campaigns were turnaround points in removing Moses from power and changing the direction of city planning. Toronto After her arrest, the Jacobs family moved to Toronto in 1968 and received Canadian citizenship. There, she became involved in stopping an expressway and rebuilding neighborhoods on a more community-friendly plan. She became a Canadian citizen and continued her work in lobbying and activism to question conventional city planning ideas. Jane Jacobs died in 2006 in Toronto.  Her family asked that she be remembered â€Å"by reading her books and implementing her ideas.† Summary of Ideas in  The Death and Life of Great American Cities In the introduction, Jacobs makes quite clear her intention: This book is an attack on current city planning and rebuilding. It is also, and mostly, an attempt to introduce new principles of city planning and rebuilding, different and even opposite from those now taught in everything from schools of architecture and planning to Sunday supplements and womens magazines. My attack is not based on quibbles about rebuilding methods or hair-splitting about fashions in design. It is an attack, rather, on the principles and aims that have shaped modern, orthodox city planning and rebuilding. Jacobs observes such commonplace realities about cities as the functions of sidewalks to tease out the answers to questions, including what makes for safety and what does not, what distinguishes parks that are marvelous from those that attract vice, why slums resist change, how downtowns shift their centers. She also makes clear that her focus is great cities and especially their inner areas and that her principles may not apply to suburbs or towns or small cities. She outlines the history of city planning and how America got to the principles in place with those charged with making change in cities, especially after World War II. She particularly argued against Decentrists who sought to decentralize populations and against followers of architect Le Corbusier, whose Radiant City idea favored high-rise buildings surrounded by parks -- high-rise buildings for commercial purposes, high-rise buildings for luxury living, and high-rise low-income projects. Jacobs argues that conventional urban renewal has harmed city life. Many theories of urban renewal seemed to assume that living in the city was undesirable. Jacobs argues that these planners ignored the intuition and experience of those actually living in the cities, who were often the most vocal opponents of the evisceration of their  neighborhoods. Planners put expressways through neighborhoods, ruining their natural ecosystems.  The way that low-income housing was introduced was, she showed, often creating even more unsafe neighborhoods where hopelessness ruled. A key principle for Jacobs is diversity, what she calls a most intricate and close-grained diversity of uses.  The benefit of diversity is mutual economic and social support.  She advocated that there were four principles to create diversity: The neighborhood should include a mixture of uses or functions. Rather than separating into separate areas the commercial, industrial, residential, and cultural spaces, Jacobs advocated for intermixing these.Blocks should be short. This would make promote walking to get to other parts of the neighborhood (and buildings with other functions), and it would also promote people interacting.Neighborhoods should contain a mixture of older and newer buildings. Older buildings might need renovation and renewal, but should not simply be razed to make room for new buildings, as old buildings made for a more continuous character of the neighborhood. Her work led to more focus on historical preservation.A sufficiently dense population, she argued, contrary to the conventional wisdom, created safety and creativity, and also created more opportunities for human interaction. Denser neighborhoods created eyes on the street more than separating and isolating people would. All four conditions, she argued, must be present, for adequate diversity.  Each city might have different ways of expressing the principles, but all were needed. Jane Jacobs Later Writings Jane Jacobs wrote six other books, but her first book remained the center of her reputation and her ideas. Her later works were: The Economy of Cities. 1969.The Question of Separatism: Quebec and the Struggle Over Sovereignty. 1980.Cities and the Wealth of Nations. 1984.Systems of Survival. 1992.The Nature of Economies. 2000.Dark Age Ahead. 2004. Selected Quotes â€Å"We expect too much of new buildings, and too little of ourselves.† â€Å"†¦that the sight of people attracts still other people, is something that city planners and city architectural designers seem to find incomprehensible. They operate on the premise that city people seek the sight of emptiness, obvious order and quiet. Nothing could be less true. The presences of great numbers of people gathered together in cities should not only be frankly accepted as a physical fact – they should also be enjoyed as an asset and their presence celebrated.† â€Å"To seek causes of poverty in this way is to enter an intellectual dead end because poverty has no causes. Only prosperity has causes.† â€Å"There is no logic that can be superimposed on the city; people make it, and it is to them, not buildings, that we must fit our plans.†

Distinct, Distinctive, and Distinguished

Though they are related, each of these three adjectives—distinct, distinctive, and distinguished—has its own meaning. Definitions The adjective distinct means separate, clearly defined, and easily distinguishable from all others. Distinct also means notable or highly probable. The adjective distinctive means having a quality that makes a person or thing noticeably different from others. The adjective distinguished means impressive, eminent, and/or worthy of respect. (Distinguished is also the past form of the verb distinguish, which means to demonstrate or perceive a difference, to see or hear [something] clearly, or to make [oneself] noteworthy.) Examples The human species, according to the best theory I can form of it, is composed of two distinct races, the men who borrow and the men who lend.(Charles Lamb, The Two Races of Men, 1813)It is from the blues that all that may be called American music derives its most distinctive characteristics.(James Weldon Johnson)Dr.  Jà ¤ger was a distinguished child psychiatrist, a music lover, and, I remember, a dog lover--he had two dachshunds, Sigmund and Sieglinde, whom he was extremely fond of.(Walker Percy,  The Thanatos Syndrome. Farrar, Straus Giroux, 1987) Usage Notes Anything that is distinct is clearly distinguishable from everything else; something distinctive is a quality or characteristic that makes it possible for us to distinguish one thing from another. Distinct speech is clear; distinctive speech is special or unusual. So a pileated woodpecker is a woodpecker distinct from most other woodpeckers, distinguishable from other woodpeckers; its large size is distinctive, helping us distinguish it from most other woodpeckers.(Kenneth G. Wilson, The Columbia Guide to Standard American English. Columbia University Press, 1993) Practice (a) The mirror was positioned so the receptionist could survey the entire waiting room from behind her desk.  It showed a _____-looking woman  in a fawn-colored suit, with long, auburn hair and a timeless gaze.(Davis Bunn, Book of Dreams. Simon Schuster, 2011)(b) Suhye let out her abrupt, _____  laugh. Her laugh was like an enormous, swollen soap bubble bursting. He could identify that laugh of hers with his eyes closed.(Jung Mi Kyung,  My Sons Girlfriend, trans. by Yu Young-Nan.  Ã‚  Columbia University Press, 2013)(c)  His face was lined with weariness and his eyes were red. There were two _____  grooves running down his cheeks from his eyes where his tears had fallen.(Alexander Godin, My Dead Brother Comes to America.  Windsor Quarterly, 1934) Answers to Practice Exercises: Distinct, Distinctive, and Distinguished (a) The mirror was positioned so the receptionist could survey the entire waiting room from behind her desk.  It showed a distinguished-looking woman  in a fawn-colored suit, with long, auburn hair and a timeless gaze.(Davis Bunn,  Book of Dreams. Simon Schuster, 2011)(b) Suhye let out her abrupt, distinctive  laugh. Her laugh was like an enormous, swollen soap bubble bursting. He could identify that laugh of hers with his eyes closed.(Jung Mi Kyung,  My Sons Girlfriend, trans. by Yu Young-Nan.  Ã‚  Columbia University Press, 2013)(c)  His face was lined with weariness and his eyes were red. There were two distinct  grooves running down his cheeks from his eyes where his tears had fallen.(Alexander Godin, My Dead Brother Comes to America.  Windsor Quarterly, 1934)